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The Boneh–Shaw Fingerprinting
Scheme is Better Than We Thought
Hans Georg Schaathun, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Digital fingerprinting is a forensic method against
illegal copying. The distributor marks each individual copy with
a unique fingerprint. If an illegal copy appears, it can be traced
back to one or more guilty pirates due to this fingerprint. To work
against a coalition of several pirates, the fingerprinting scheme
must be based on a collusion-secure code. This paper addresses
binary collusion-secure codes in the setting of Boneh and Shaw
(1995/1998). We prove that the Boneh–Shaw scheme is more
efficient than originally proven, and we propose adaptations to
further improve the scheme. We also point out some differences
between our model and others in the literature.
Index Terms—Collusion-secure codes, copyright protection, dig-
ital fingerprinting (FP), traitor tracing.
I. INTRODUCTION
UNAUTHORIZED copying and distribution of copyrightedmaterial has received increasing attention over many
years, both in research communities and in the daily press.
Authors and artists depend on their income from legal sales,
and unauthorised copying is often seen as a threat to these
sales. For the movie or music industry, this is a question of big
money.
Estimated losses due to illegal copying are generally dis-
putable. There is no generally accepted method to estimate the
sales that would have been achieved without illegal copying.
For example, it is sometimes claimed that illegally distributed
copies have a promotional effect which actually increases sales.
Still, it is clear that big money is at stake and the issue receives
interest from many different angles. Several countries these
days change their legislation to deal more effectively with
illegal distribution in new media.
Digital fingerprinting (FP) was introduced in [1], and given
increasing attention following [2]. A vendor selling digital
copies of copyrighted material wants to prevent illegal copying.
Digital FP is supposed to make it possible to trace the guilty
user (pirate) when an illegal copy is found. This is done by
embedding a secret identification mark, called a fingerprint, in
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each copy, making every copy unique. FP can also be used to
protect broadcast encryption keys (i.e., cable TV decoders), in
which context it is usually referred to as traitor tracing [3].
The fingerprint must be embedded in such a way that it does
not disturb the information in the data file too much. It must also
be impossible for the user to remove or damage the fingerprint,
without damaging the information contents beyond any prac-
tical use. In particular, the fingerprint must survive any change
of file format (e.g., gif to tiff) and any reasonable lossy com-
pression. This embedding problem is essentially the same as the
problem of watermarking.
If a single pirate distributes unauthorized copies, they will
carry his or her fingerprint. If the vendor discovers the illegal
copies he or she can trace them back to the pirate and prosecute
him or her. If several pirates collude, they can to some extent
tamper with the fingerprint. When they compare their copies,
they see some bits (or symbols) which differ and, thus, must
be part of the fingerprint. Identified bits may be changed and,
thus, the pirates create a hybrid copy with a false fingerprint.
Collusion-secure coding is required to enable tracing of at least
one pirate where a coalition of pirates have colluded.
In this paper, we study binary, concatenated, FP schemes gen-
eralizing and improving the approach of [2]. In Section II, we
will define the FP model, which we refine a little compared to
past literature. In Section III, we give the main result, which is
an improved error analysis of the BS FP scheme and new vari-
ants of it. Section IV gives further improvements in the two pi-
rate case, and we finish with a conclusion and comparison with
other schemes in Section V.
II. FINGERPRINTING PROBLEM
A. Preliminaries From Coding Theory
An code is a set of words of symbols from an
alphabet of elements. The Hamming distance between two
words and is denoted , and the minimum distance
of a code is denoted . The normalized minimum distance is
.
Closest neighbor decoding is any algorithm which takes a
word and returns a word such that is minimized.
This can always be performed in operations and, for
some codes, it may be faster.
For the error analysis, we will use the well-known Chernoff
bound as given in the following theorem. See, for example, [5]
for a proof. The relative entropy function is defined as
(1)
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Theorem 1 (Chernoff): Let be bounded, indepen-
dent, and identically distributed stochastic variables in the range
[0,1]. Let be their (common) expected value. Then, for any
, we have
We write for the binomial distribution with trials
with probability . If is distributed as , we write
. All logarithms will be to base 2 unless otherwise stated.
B. BS Model and Marking Assumption
Our model follows that of Boneh and Shaw (BS) [2]. Let
be a digital file divided into segments .
We call the file alphabet. Let be the set of users. We can
view as a customer account number. Write .
The model assumes a watermarking scheme with an em-
bedder allowing us to hide a symbol from some alphabet
in a file segment , producing a watermarked file segment
. The extractor inverts the embedding; given , it
outputs .
The fingerprint encoder is an injective map ,
identifying each user by a fingerprint ,
where . The image under of a subset is
denoted . The secret key is drawn uniformly at random
from a key space when the system is initialized, and kept
secret by the vendor. The set is an code
called the FP code (corresponding to ).
When user buys a copy of file , the vendor obtains the
fingerprint , and embeds each in to
obtain the fingerprinted file , which is handed
to the user.
If user naïvly copies and redistributes , then the
watermarks can be extracted to obtain the fingerprint
, which identifies the pirate who can
be prosecuted. If several pirates collude, they can cut and paste
segments from their different copies. Thus, the output from
the extractor will match one of the pirate fingerprints, but
the full sequence is a hybrid fingerprint which
matches none of the pirates.
The BS model presumes that this cut-and-paste attack is the
only one available to the pirates. This is expressed formally by
the marking assumption.
Definition 2 (The Marking Assumption): Let be the
set of fingerprints held by a coalition of pirates. The pirates can
produce a copy with a false fingerprint for any ,
where
We call the feasible set of .
A position where the pirates see at least two symbols and,
thus, have a choice is called a detectable position.
Example 3 (Traitor Tracing): Collusion-secure codes are
used for traitor tracing [3], where Definition 2 is satisfied as
follows. The system uses a matrix of permanent keys
. Each row corresponds to an alphabet symbol and each
column to a coordinate position. The user with fingerprint
receives the key for every . The session
key is the exclusive or of elements to . An enabling
block is transmitted at the start of each session consisting of
for each and , where is the encryption function
for key . To get the session key, one key from each column of
the matrix is required, and that is exactly what each user has.
When the pirates make a pirate decoder box, they must supply
it with a key for each coordinate position from one of their true
fingerprints and, thus, the marking assumption is satisfied.
Some authors use alternative marking assumptions. Some
models assume that the pirates can output any symbol in a
detectable position, or they may be allowed to output an erasure
(no valid symbol) in detectable positions. See [6] and [7] for
details. Muratani [8] uses a stronger assumption where the pi-
rates output each word in the feasible set with equal probability,
allowing much shorter codewords. Some authors assume that
the pirates have a certain probability of outputting a random
symbol from the alphabet in every column. These lead to the
study of error- and collusion-secure codes [9].
C. FP Scheme
An FP scheme is an ensemble
, where is the encoding as defined in the previous
section, and the FP code is an code. The tracing al-
gorithm takes a hybrid fingerprint as an input and outputs
a set . It is successful if is a nonempty subset of the
pirates. The rate of the FP scheme is the rate of the code ,
namely .
We adhere to Kerchoff’s principles, so the key is random and
secret, and everything but the key is public information. That
is, the pirates know the definition of and . If the entire
system is leaked, a new random key can be chosen for the same
scheme, and it will be secure for future applications (until the
key is again compromised).
The game proceeds in the following steps.
1) The vendor chooses the FP scheme to use for the product
he or she is selling; this is the vendor strategy. We assume
that this is known to the pirates.
2) The key is chosen at random, and kept secret by the
vendor.
3) The copies of the digital data are generated using the FP
scheme and the key, and distributed to the users. A coalition
of (potential) pirates is thus assigned fingerprints
, and receives a set of
fingerprinted copies.
4) The coalition of potential pirates gets together and com-
pares the copies .
5) If Error is sufficiently low, the pirates seeing
will opt out, without committing any crime.
6) If the pirates choose to play, they choose a strategy for
selecting segments from the different copies, paste together
a hybrid copy, and sell the copies with a hybrid fingerprint
.
7) If and when an illegal copy is discovered, the vendor ex-
tracts the hybrid FP , computes , and prosecutes
any users traced.
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Note that we have three outcomes of the game. The pirates can
choose not to play (Event 0). If they do play, we get a random
outcome, either error where the pirates win, or error where the
pirates lose.
For an event , let denote the probability of
under the distribution induced by the uniform distribution of
under the assumption that the pirates always play regardless
of and choose strategy in Step 6. The pirates want to es-
cape and will therefore choose to maximize , so let
. The traditional definition of col-
lusion-secure codes is based on the unconditional probability
Error , given no information about or .
Definition 4 (Weak Security): An FP scheme is (weak)
-secure if, for any , Error when a set
of pirates is drawn uniformly at random.
Unauthorized copying is a criminal act (in most countries),
and pirates that are caught will therefore be subject to punish-
ment. The primary reason for assigning punishment is to deter
potential pirates. The vendor’s goal is not necessarily to win the
game (make the pirates lose). Deterring the pirates (Event 0)
obtaining a stalemate where nobody wins and nobody loses is
perfectly satisfactory.
The pirates choose whether to play or not in Step 5,
according to their perceived probability of escaping (i.e.,
Error ). This probability can be higher or lower
than the unconditional probability Error . We expect that
there is a threshold such that the pirates choose to play if
and only if Error . If Error ,
we get Event 0. Note that a (weak) -secure code is not
sufficient to deter all pirate coalitions of size or less. This is
why we introduce a new and stronger definition.
Definition 5 (Strong Security): An FP scheme is strongly
-secure if, for any seen by at most pirates, we have
Error .
Clearly, a strongly -secure FP scheme will deter any pirate
coalition of size at most if . By abuse of language, we
shall sometimes say that is -secure when the scheme
is.
Definition 6: Let be an FP scheme. The a priori error bound
is the smallest such that is (weak) -secure. The a
posteriori error bound is the smallest such that is strongly
-secure.
Even though the explicit definition of strong -secure codes is
new, many previous schemes do meet the definition, including
the BS scheme. Some authors bound Error for any
, which clearly bounds .
The phenomenon that pirates with a higher escape proba-
bility are more likely to play is called adverse selection in eco-
nomics and game theory. This affects the following interesting
probability:
Error The pirates did play
Of course, when the vendor finds an illegal copy, he or she
knows that the pirates have played, and it is interesting for him
or her (and for the court if the FP scheme is used as evidence),
what the error probability is under this condition. The following
lemmata gives some information about this.
Lemma 7: When the vendor obtains an illegal copy having
only the knowledge of the key and the false fingerprint , the
probability of getting an incorrect output from is, at
most, the a posteriori error bound .
Proof: Since bounds the conditional error probability
for any information that the pirate could have; in particular, it
bounds this probability for any information which would induce
the pirates to play. Hence, also bounds the probability of error
under the condition that the pirates play.
Lemma 8: Unless Error is constant over all ,
there is a pirate strategy such that .
Proof: Write Error , and write
Suppose the pirates choose to play whenever . Write
. Then, we get that
We clearly get that since we have removed only small
terms from the average.
To summarize, if the pirates decide to do illegal copying be-
fore they see their copies, their chance of escape is at most .
For any pirate collusion of size, at most, having compared their
copies, the chance of escape is, at most, . Which error bound
is the most important will depend on the application.
Definition 9 (Errors and Failures): Let be the output
of the tracing algorithm and be the pirate collusion. An
error of Type I (or a failure) is the event that . An error of
Type II (or false accusation) is the event that .
In the context of criminal law, we know that Type II errors
are a serious matter. Frequent Type I errors mean that we often
do not get useful output, but they do not affect the reliability
of the output which is obtained. If Type II errors are frequent,
the output cannot be trusted even when we have output. For the
rest of this paper, will denote the a posteriori probability of
Type I error, and the a posteriori probability of Type II error.
A scheme with such error probabilities is said to be (strongly)
-secure.
III. CONCATENATED SCHEMES
In this chapter, we develop a general analysis of concatenated
FP schemes. Such concatenation was applied in [2], but our error
analysis will prove that those constructions have a better error
rate than originally proven. We make the following formal def-
inition of concatenated schemes.
Definition 10 (Concatenated Fingerprinting Scheme): Let
be an FP scheme, and
an FP scheme. Let denote the alphabet of .
A concatenated FP scheme
consists of the following elements. The key is a tuple
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, where is a key for and
are keys for . The encoding is
where and (2)
Each segment of the word is called a block. The algo-
rithm first decodes each block using , and then decodes
the resulting word over using .
Note that the FP code of is the concatenation of the FP
codes of and . Let and denote the rates of and
, respectively. We demand that is strongly secure,
but our analysis is otherwise oblivious to its structure. On the
other hand, the error analysis must be made separately for each
type of outer scheme , but this scheme does not have to be
collusion-secure in itself.
We analyze two different kinds of outer codes, namely
random codes as suggested in [2] in Section III-B, and codes
with large minimum distance in Section III-D. The probability
of Type II errors is bounded for each choice of outer codes. In
Section III-C, we study parameters of the BS codes (i.e., using
the inner code of [2] and random outer codes).
The original concatenated BS scheme will be named BS–RC.
The acronym before the dash indicates the inner code, the BS
inner code, and the last letters indicate the outer code, a random
code. Other schemes discussed in this section are BS–RS with
Reed–Solomon outer codes, and BS–AG with asymptotic alge-
braic-geometry (AG) outer codes.
A. Decoding and Type I Errors
For the outer tracing algorithm , we use list decoding,
defined as follows.
Definition 11: A list decoding algorithm for a code takes
as input an word and a threshold and returns the set
We have chosen list decoding because it gives us simple
proofs. It has the additional advantage that we often get to trace
several pirates.
Remark 12: The closest neighbor of will be in the list
unless . Hence, if list decoding is successful, then the
closest neighbor decoding is successful too. Thus, we can use
the closest neighbor decoding instead without increasing the
total error probability. However, when , list decoding
gives Type I error and closest neighbor gives Type II.
Let be the number of blocks where inner decoding
is incorrect. The pirates match in at least blocks
on average, which means that if , then
at least one guilty pirate is caught.
Observe that is the sum of independent Bernoulli trials
with probability at most . It follows that:
where , and we get the following theorem by
the Chernoff bound.
Theorem 13: Let be a strongly -secure FP scheme,
and a scheme where is list decoding
with threshold . Then, using , the probability of
identifying no guilty user is
if
Corollary 14: If and ,
then the probability of Type I error tends to zero with increasing
code length .
Note that the bound on depends only on , , , and
. It is oblivious to . The Type II error probability will
depend on the design of . The inner code keys have to be
independent so that errors in two distinct blocks are independent
events. Otherwise, the Chernoff bound would not be applicable.
B. Random Codes (RC)
BS used random codes for . Let be an ma-
trix over where every entry is chosen independently and uni-
formly at random. Suppose some arbitrary ordering on . The
encoding maps the th user to the th row of .
Theorem 15: Let be a scheme using random
codes for . If , the probability of including a
given innocent user in the output list is bounded as
and the total Type II error probability is bounded as
Proof: Consider the output from inner decoding and an
innocent user . Let . Clearly, is
a stochastic variable with distribution , and
. The error probability is bounded as
and the theorem follows by Chernoff’s bound.
Corollary 16: The Type II error probability tends to zero with
an increasing length if and
.
One great advantage of random codes is that they can be
made for any number of users quite trivially. Observe that for
increasing , the bound on is unaltered, and the bound on
degrades gracefully.
C. BS Concatenated Code
The following -secure scheme was used in [2]. Let
be a code with a codebook consisting of
distinct columns, each replicated times. A set of iden-
tical columns will be called a type. Every column has the form
, such that the th user has zeroes
in the first types and a one in the rest.
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Example 17: The BS inner code for and is the
set of the following five codewords:
The key maps the code onto an equivalent code by
permuting the columns. View as the identity. We can see that
unless user is a pirate, the pirates cannot distinguish between
the th and the th type. Hence, they have to use the same
probability of choosing a 1 in both of these types. The tracing
algorithm uses statistics to test the null hypothesis that user
be innocent. The output is some user(s) for whom the null
hypothesis may be rejected.
The key size in bits is
The probability of accusing a given innocent user is bounded as
Theorem 18 (BS): The BS inner code with replication factor
is strongly secure whenever .
Let BS–RC be the scheme with as described
above and a random code with list decoding for . There are
several control parameters which may be used to tune the per-
formance of the system. The inner code cardinality is the trick-
iest one. Most of the time, we will follow BS and set .
Obviously, and control a tradeoff between the code length
and error rate, and controls the tradeoff between the two error
types.
Theorem 19: If we use
then BS–RC is a strongly -secure FP scheme,
where
(3)
(4)
Asymptotically, the length is
(5)
In order to use Theorem 13, we require so that
the first argument to is positive. In this theorem, is only
slightly greater than this minimum. In order to use Corollary
14, we require , but to make linear in ,
TABLE I
SOME LENGTHS WHEN t = logM
must, in fact, be much smaller than . The choice of
gives .
Proof: We have . We get (3) by expanding
the parameters and in the definition. Equation (4) follows
from the two bounds on from Theorems 13 and 15. Using
the fact that , we get
Equation (5) follows easily by combining this with (3).
Sample rates are presented in Table I, both for our analysis
and for that of BS. Considering asymptotic classes of codes,
can be made smaller. The following theorem gives the better
rates.
Theorem 20: There exists an asymptotic class of BS–RC FP
schemes with exponentially declining error probability for any
rate satisfying
(6)
if and are natural numbers such that
.
Proof: Asymptotically, can be taken arbitrarily close to
, and by Theorem 18, we get that
By Theorem 15, the outer rate can be chosen arbitrarily close
to . We get the following component code
rates:
which gives the total rate as stated in the theorem.
In Table II, we can see some asymptotic rates for our codes,
as well as those of [6] Barg Blakley, and Kabatiansky (BBK).
We note that BBK has the better rate for few pirates, whereas
ours is better against seven pirates. It is also interesting to note
that is not the maximizing value of asymptotically, except
for .
D. Outer Code With Large Distance
We recall that codes with sufficiently large distance give com-
binatorially secure codes. The BBK scheme introduced outer
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TABLE II
ASYMPTOTIC RATES AND MAXIMIZING VALUES OF q AND r FOR THE
BS–RC VODES FOR SOME NUMBERS OF PIRATES
codes where the minimum distance is large enough not only to
successfully trace, but also to correct for some decoding errors
from the inner decoding. We shall see how this can be com-
bined with strongly -secure inner codes following the lines
of BS-RC.
Let be a strongly -secure scheme as before. Let
be an upper bound on the probability of accusing a given inno-
cent user . Even though this is a parameter traditionally not ex-
plicitly stated for constructed FP schemes, it is often known by
a bound at least as good as that for , which is often bounded
as .
We do not require randomization for the outer scheme when
it is based on a large minimum distance (i.e., the key space is
a Singleton set), and the ensemble contains a unique pair
. The encoding is arbitrary and the tracing is
list decoding with threshold as before.
Let be the minimum distance of , and
be a pirate coalition. Consider a false
fingerprint after inner decoding and an arbitrary innocent
user . For each , matches in, at most,
positions. If inner decoding were error free, would match
in, at most, positions.
First, we study the probability that an innocent user
be accused. Let be the set of coordinates where is different
from any pirate, and let be the complement (i.e., the set
of positions where match at least one pirate). Let be a
stochastic variable which is one if and only if , and
the total number of such matches. We get that
We have . If we let be any subset of
size , we get
where
We have that is 1 with probability at most and 0 oth-
erwise. The probability is
bounded as
Using the Chernoff bound, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 21: The probability of accusing a given innocent
user in as described in this section is
The total probability of Type II error is
This error bound is rather pessimistic. We assume that the hy-
brid fingerprint matches the innocent user in every block where
one pirate matches the innocent.
Combining Theorems 13 and 21, we get that
which implies . Any asymptotic code requires
by the Plotkin bound. A good can-
didate as an outer code with large minimum distance is the
RS codes, which can be decoded with
the Guruswami–Sudan (GS) algorithm [10], with polynomial
complexity in .
Example 22: An RS outer code can be combined with a BS
inner code. Take, for instance, and . Let
and , and use a BS as inner code. As
an outer code, we use a generalized RS code. With a
decoding threshold of , we get a total error rate of
. The total length is . These parameters
are inferior to BS–RC, but are still good enough to be interesting
for applications where decoding complexity is important.
Concatenations of BS inner codes and RS outer codes will be
denoted as BS–RS. We have from the inner
code, and due to the distance requirement. This gives
us , which is inferior to BS–RC. Furthermore,
it is rather difficult to find the optimal choices for the various
parameters.
To make asymptotic classes of codes, we can use the AG
codes guaranteed by the following result from [11].
Theorem 23: For any , there are constructible, infi-
nite families of codes with parameters for
and
Observe that these codes require , and recall
that . Hence, the AG codes require . The
problem is that large require very long codewords in the BS
inner code. Using AG and RS codes would be much more ef-
fective if the inner code could be improved.
Proposition 24: If there is an strongly -secure
code where the probability of accusing a given innocent user
is at most , then there is an asymptotic family of strongly
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-secure codes with any rate of less than ,
where solves
and where vanishes exponentially.
Proof: We see from Theorem 13 that exponentially de-
clining is obtained if , but can be taken
arbitrarily close to this bound. From Theorem 21, we get that
will decline exponentially if ,
where
Again, can be taken arbitrarily close to this bound. By The-
orem 23, we get
giving
Now, can be taken arbitrarily close to the solution of the
equation stated in the proposition.
IV. FIGHTING TWO PIRATES
We mentioned that the BS replication codes may not be the
ideal choice for inner codes. For two pirates, we have good al-
ternatives, which we consider in this section.
It was proven in [12] that so-called separating systems (SS)
give -secure schemes . The FP code is
equivalent to a (2,2)-separating base code , is arbitrary,
and is an exhaustive search through all possible two sets
. The [31,5,15] Simplex code is -secure,
and the [126,14] dual BCH code is -secure.
We define three new concatenated schemes, all using sepa-
rating inner codes as described above. The SS–RC scheme uses
random outer codes as described in Section III-B. The SS–RS
and SS–AG codes use, respectively, Reed–Solomon and AG
codes as described in Section III-D.
A. Asymptotic Constructions
The best asymptotic rate offered for in [6] was 0.015,
using the [126,14] BCH dual as inner code and an AG outer
code. On the other hand, [12] offered a rate of 0.026 for an
asymptotic class of (2,2)-SS.
Theorem 25: The SS–RC scheme with the [126,14] punc-
tured dual of the two-error-correcting BCH code as an inner
code, forms an infinite class of strongly -secure schemes
with rate , for any and exponentially declining
error probability given as
for any such that .
The algebraic structure of SS–AG makes it possible to take
advantage of the fact that the inner codes have and make
concatenated schemes which also have .
For any innocent user and a hybrid fingerprint , we have
. Hence, will never be accused if
. Asymptotically, can be taken arbitrarily close to
. The bound on is found from Theorem 13
It is necessary that , which gives us
By Theorem 23, we obtain outer code rate arbitrarily close to
The [126,14] inner code, gives and an overall rate
of 0.0269. This is not as good as using random codes, but it is
better than the BBK scheme [6], and like BBK, it can be GS
decoded. An alternative inner code is the [15,4,8] code. This is
too small to use AG codes (cf. Thm. 23), but it works well with
random codes.
Theorem 26: The SS–RC scheme with a [15,4,8] inner code
forms an infinite class of strongly -secure codes with rate
, for any , and exponentially declining error prob-
abilities given as
and
for any such that .
Corollary 27: The SS–RC codes with [15,4,8] inner codes
are strongly secure with length
for any such that .
B. Practical Codes
In Table III, we present code lengths for 1000 to a billion
users with the schemes we know, including those of [13] and
[14]. The RS–RC codes are computed with , .
The error probabilities were set such that and both are less
than . We used for users,
for users, for users, for
users, and for users.
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TABLE III
CODE LENGTHS AGAINST TWO PIRATES FOR 1000 TO A BILLION
USERS AND ERROR PROBABILITY "  10
TABLE IV
SOME SS–RS CODES
The constructions of SS–RS are shown in Table IV and the
general result is given in the theorem below. Also, the [126,14]
and [254,24] BCH duals are secure.
Theorem 28: Let be a concatenated code of an
-secure inner code and a RS code .
If we use GS decoding for , then is 2-secure with
and
where (7)
Proof: We have where
, from the proof of Theorem 13. Using the facts
that and , we get the theorem.
There is a variant from [15] using Simplex inner codes,
Reed–Solomon outer codes, and a more complicated inner
decoding algorithm.
V. OTHER KNOWN SCHEMES AND CONCLUSION
We have studied concatenated collusion-secure codes. As
inner codes, we suggest separating codes in the two pirate case,
and the BS inner code in the general case. As outer codes, we
propose random codes, Reed–Solomon codes, or asymptotic
AG codes. One of the schemes, BS–RC, is the classic of [2], but
our analysis shows length can be less than previously assumed.
Samples with an error rate of show a reduction by a
factor of about 2.1.
We know of one other strongly -secure scheme for our
model, namely the BBK scheme of [6]. The BBK scheme is very
good against a few pirates. Against sufficiently many pirates
the BS-based schemes are better. Asymptotically, BS-RC has
the best rate for seven pirates and more. Against two pirates,
our construction of SS–RS appears to give the best codes for a
thousand to a billion users, whereas SS–RC has the best known
asymptotic rate.
There are many other FP schemes in the literature, but most
of them use different marking assumptions and, thus, fall out-
side the scope of this paper. There are two schemes which are
weakly -secure under the BS marking assumption, due to
Tardos [13] and LBH [14]. Tardos has a code length of
, giving it the best known rate for many parame-
ters. LBH is very good against three pirates, but .
The best asymptotic decoding complexity is polynomial in
, obtained by the GS algorithm for AG outer codes, in-
cluding the BBK scheme. Using random codes (i.e., for BS–RC
and SS–RC as well as Tardos), a linear search through the code
is needed for decoding. Decoding of BBK, however, is exponen-
tial in , and this problem is avoided by BS–RS. Thus, against
many pirates, BS–RS has the most efficient decoding algorithm
known, even for weak security.
An interesting open problem is lower bounds on the code
length in terms of and . The few known bounds are inde-
pendent of . Another open issue is optimizing the construc-
tion parameters of our schemes.
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